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Abstract  tributions  for the variables considered  to be
stochastic  in  nature  are  estimated  and  in- This  study  examines  the  effects  of  alter-  cuded  in the  model.  Pseudorandm  nu-
native  government  farm  programs  and  hy-
pothetical price variability levels on two Texas  bers are  drawn  and used with the  estimated
cotton farms which were simulated stochast-  probability  density  functions  (pdfs)  to  de-
ically over a  10-year period.  Results indicate  velop  random  values  for  the  variables  con-
that a  combination  of high  price variability  sidered to be stochastic  in nature. When the
and  participation  in  government  programs  model  is  iterated  many times,  the  range  of
stimulates  growth and wealth  accumulation.  possible outcomes for a specific situation can
be estimated and compared with the possible Key words: farm programs,  price variability,  outcomes of alternative  situations.
simulation,  cotton.  In most cases,  a  covariance  matrix for the
Policy analysts  have frequently used sim-  stochastic  variables  is  estimated  from  time-
ulation models to test the possible outcomes  series data and is used to represent the joint
of alternative  farm  programs.  The  Wharton  pdf.  The  estimated covariance  matrix is sen-
agricultural  model  (Chen),  the  COMGEM  sitive to both the data used and any detrend-
model (Penson et al.), and the POLISIM model  ing  procedures  applied.  Also,  use  of time-
(Ray and Richardson)  can all be used to test  series data implies that the covariance  matrix
the effects of hypothetical  farm programs on  is assumed to be constant over  the time pe-
price,  total  production,  and use of a variety  riod specified by the data, which may not be
of agricultural  commodities.  Other  simula-  the  case.  Price  variability  can  be  affected,
tion models  have  been  developed  that rep-  among other things, by: (a) the farm program,
resent  individual  farms.  These  models  are  (b)  changes  in  market  structure such  as  in-
used to evaluate the effects of farm programs  creased  participation  in  the  international
on the  fnancial  situations  of "typical"  pro-  market,  and  (c)  institutions such as the Chi-
ducers.  Models  of this  variety  include  the  cago  Board  of Trade.  Because  the  assumed cago  Board  of Trade.  Because  the  assumed FLIPSIM  V  model  developed  by Richardson  ra  t  strute  as
and Nixon and the FLIPRIP model developed  isiution  m  e  st
by  Skees.  Simulation  is  often  preferable  to  infuence  on simulation  outcomes,  it would
other techniques  because  it can  be used to  be  useful  to test  the  sensitivity  of the  sim-
assess  complex  interactions  involving  ran-  ulation results  to changes  in the  covariance
dom processes  that can  not be solved  math-  matrix.
ematically.  The  objective  of this  study is to  examine
Because prices, yields, and demand for ag-  the  effects of participation  in selected  farm
ricultural commodities  can not be accurately  programs on the growth  and survival of two
forecasted,  some analysts  prefer  to incorpo-  different  size cotton farms in the Texas  High
rate  some of the  randomness of nature  and  Plains  under alternative  levels  of price  vari-
the marketplace  into the  simulation  model.  ability.  Although the  study will not provide
Generally,  the parameters of probability dis-  an  exhaustive  analysis  of the  sensitivity  of
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97farm policy simulation results to the assumed  grams and the national  level of participation
pdf of crop prices, it should provide a general  influence  the  distribution  of  market  price
indication  of the  importance  of the assump-  (Gardner; Lin et al.; Meyers and Ryan; Salathe
tions  concerning  these  pdfs.  It  is  hypothe-  et al.), these aggregate  effects are beyond the
sized that farm growth and survival differ not  scope  of this study.  It is assumed  that price
only when different  levels  of farm  program  variability  caused  by  changes  in  the  farm
participation are assumed but also under dif-  program  over the period of the data are cap-
ferent levels of price variability.  If this is the  tured  in the  historical  covariance  matrix.
case, policy makers should be concerned with  Although the  CCC  program  involves  both
the effects of farm policy on price variability  a  support  price  and  a  release  price,  their
and  policy  analysts  should  use  a  range  of  relative  positions with respect to the market
price  variability  levels  rather  than  relying  price  have been  such that,  in  spite  of gen-
solely  on historical  pdfs.  erally favorable  market  conditions  through-
out  the  late  1970's,  the  release  price  for
BACKGROUND  cotton has not been triggered  since 1974.  It
Since its initiation in 1938, the Commodity  should also be remembered  that the release
Credit Corporation  (CCC)  loan program  has  price is not a legislated price ceiling. When
been  one  of the fundamental  institutions  of  market price exceeds  the release  price,  gov-
United  States  farm  policy  for  cotton.  This  ernment  owned  stocks,  if  available,  are  re-
program provides a support price (loan rate),  leased from storage. If insufficient stocks are
or  guaranteed  minimum  price,  to  cotton  owned by the government to satisfy demand
farmers who participate in the farm program.  at the release price, market price will remain
If the  market  price  is  below the  loan  rate,  above the release price. In no year from 1972
the government provides a nonrecourse  loan  to  1981  were  government  owned  stocks
to producers.  If the farmer  does not redeem  greater than 500 bales. For these reasons, the
the  loan  within  9  months,  the  stocks  are  effect  of the  loan  program  should be  to in-
turned  over to the government.  Government  crease  the mean of the farm-level  price  dis-
owned stocks  are  released when the market  tribution.
price  is above  a  designated  "release  price,"  Because of the nature of the CCC and target
which  is usually  some function  of the  loan  price  programs,  it  is  hypothesized  that  in-
rate,  such  as  140  percent.  creased price variability will result in higher
During the  1960's, the loan rate for cotton  average  incomes  for  farm  program  partici-
was frequently high relative to world market  pants.  With  increased  price  variability,  the
prices  and,  thus,  government  stocks  accu-  probability of receiving  very high prices in-
mulated.  The  target  price  (deficiency  pay-  creases. Athough the probability of very low
ment)  program  was  designed  to  provide  market  prices  also  increases,  the  loan  and
income  support to producers without inter-  target price program protects producers from
fering with the market price. The target price  the  downside  risk.  Because  the  probability
is set by legislation and traditionally has been  of some  very  "good"  years  increases,  it  is
tied  loosely to  the  cost of production.  Par-  likely  that  the  combination  of  high  price
ticipating producers receive a deficiency pay-  variability and participation  in the farm pro-
ment  equal  to  the  difference  between  the  gram would stimulate expansion as sufficient
target  price  and  the  higher  of loan  rate  or  cash  would  be  available  in  some  years  to
season average market price. Total deficiency  finance  downpayments  on  machinery  and
payments to any one producer are limited to  land.  It is  uncertain,  a priori,  if the proba-
$50,000.  bility of bankruptcy  will  increase  as  price
At the  individual  farm level,  the loan rate  variability increases.  This will  depend,  to  a
and the target price  program affects  the  dis-  large  degree,  on the  level  of protection  of-
persion of price and income respectively by  fered  by participation  in the farm program.
truncating the lower tails of the distributions,
leading  to  higher  means  and  smaller  vari-  METHODOLOGY
ances.  As  the  dispersion  of the  distribution  Two  different  cotton  farms  in  the  Texas
increases,  more of the lower tail is truncated  Southern High Plains were simulated assum-
by  the  farm  programs.  The  effects  of trun-  ing three  farm  program  participation  possi-
cation  are  therefore  increased  as  price  and  bilities  and  five  different  price  variability
income  variability  increase.  Although  both  assumptions. A whole-farm simulation model,
the  specific  provisions  of government  pro-  FLIPSIM V1,  was used to evaluate the impacts
1FLIPSIM  is  documented  in  Richardson  and Nixon.
98of selected farm programs and different prob-  TABLE  1.  PRICES  AND  YIELDS  FOR  TYPICAL  COTTON  FARMS  IN
THE  TEXAS  SOUTHERN  HIGH  PLAINS  USED  IN THE  STUDY ability  distributions  for  cotton  and  cotton-
seed  prices  on  farm  growth  and  survival.  Yield  Cotton  Cottonseed
FLIPSIM  V was used for the analyses because  Year  Irrigated  Dryland  price  price
it is capable of simulating different size  crop  ----------lb./acre----------  cents/lb.  $/ton
farms  under  alternative  farm  programs  and  197  474  297  32.05  54 . 1972  ....  415  377  24.58  51.5
price probability distributions.  1973  ....  591  650  56.04  97.0
Possible crop enterprises on the farm were  1974  ....  341  0  27.87  125.0
1975  ....  212  337  48.67  88.0 dryland  and irrigated cotton lint and cotton-  1976  ....  553  187  58.60  99.0
seed.  The  base  probability  distributions  of  1977  ....  552  380  42.00  64.0
crop prices and yields were developed using  197  ....  4  419  53.4  122.0 1979  ....  369  91  59.43  112.0
historical  data  (1971-1982)  for  these  vari-  1980  ....  215  152  68.04  119.0
ables in the study area.  Prices  and yields for  1981  ....  667  347  44.65  80.0
1982  ...  0  0  49.21  85.0 all crop enterprises of the typical farms were
assumed  to  have  a  multivariate  normal  dis-  For example, in the -60 percent matrix (price
tribution. Annual  harvested acre  yields for a  variability  level  I),  the  base  covariance  be-
representative  farm were  obtained from  the  tween  cotton lint  and cottonseed  price was
local  Agricultural  Stabilization  and  Conser-  multiplied  by .16  (.40 X  .40) because both
vation  Service  (ASCS)  office.  Because  these  standard deviations were scaled down by 0.40.
yields  are  not  available  in  any  publication,  The base covariance between cotton lint price
they are  reported  in Table  1.  Annual  cotton  and  dryland  cotton yield was  multiplied  by
lint prices  for the period  were  obtained  by  .4  because  only  the  standard  deviation  for
randomly  drawing one  price  from  the daily  price  was  altered.  Five  different  price  vari-
January prices reported for the Lubbock cash  ability  levels  were used  in this  study.  Price
cotton market  for each  of the years  1971  to  variability  level  I  involved  a  60 percent  re-
1982  (USDA).2  A similar approach was  used  duction  in the standard  deviation  for prices
to obtain cottonseed  prices for this time pe-  and level II represented a  40 percent reduc-
riod.  (Average  annual prices  and county  av-  tion  in these standard  deviations.  Price  var-
erage yields were not used because averaging  iability level III was the historical base. Price
would  result  in  a  downward  bias  in  the es-  variability levels IV and V involved increases
timate of the variability  faced  by individual  in the  standard  deviation for the  price vari-
producers.)  The prices used in the study are  ablesof 40 percent and 60  percent,  respec-
also reported in Table  1. The base covariance  tively.
matrix was developed  from deviations about
the  means.  No  statistically  significant  trend  ALTERNATIVE  POLICIES TESTED
was found  in yields during this period so no
detrending procedure was applied. Although  The  alternative  farm  program  scenarios
this was generally an inflationary period, the  analyzed  include:  (a)  full  participation  in
prices were  not deflated  because  it was  be-  the  1981  provisions  of the  1981  Farm  Bill
lieved  that  producers  often  perceive  varia-  including  the  target  price  (70.9  cents/
bility  in  nominal,  not  real,  terms  and  the  pound),  loan rate  (52.5  cents/pound),  and
prices  were  not  moving  in  a  consistently  all-risk  crop  insurance  (BASIC);  (b)  partici-
upwards  direction.  Because  the objective  of  pation  in the  loan  program  and  crop-insur-
this  study  is  to  test  the  sensitivity  of farm  ance  (NOTAR);  and  (c)  participation in crop
growth  and  survival  to  different  levels  of  insurance  only  (NOSUPP).
price  variability,  little would  be  gained  by  A supply control  mechanism,  such  as  set-
deflating  prices.  aside,  was  not included  in the  analyses  for
Four hypothetical probability distributions  two reasons.  First,  no  supply control  provi-
for prices  and  yields  were  developed  from  sion was in effect during the  1981 crop year.
the  base  covariance  matrix.  Standard  devia-  More importantly,  inclusion of a supply con-
tions of prices in the base covariance  matrix  trol  measure would  make the  results  of the
were  scaled  up and down  over  the range  of  three  policy options  difficult  to compare.  A
plus or  minus  60 percent,  but the  same set  supply  control  program  links  participation
of means  was  used for  all  five  of the  pdfs.  in the price and income protection provisions
zIt  was  assumed  all cotton  lint would be  sold in January  since  most cotton  in the  study  area  (88  percent)  is
ginned  by mid-January  (Bailey).
99of the farm program to a reduction in acreage  cotton. Larger farms also had lower cash pro-
for  the  program  commodities,  but  acreage  duction  costs because  of the  ability to  take
reduction  is  generally  not required  for par-  advantage  of volume  discounts.  In addition,
ticipation  in crop-insurance.  In the NOSUPP  larger farms are able  to use machinery more
trial,  therefore,  overall  cotton  production  efficiently,  leading  to  lower  per  acre  ma-
would be higher than  in the other trials  be-  chinery costs.
cause  there would be no requirement  to re-  Differences in financial characteristics,  off-
duce  acreage.  Higher  production  would  farm income, and living expenses associated
exacerbate  the  effects  of changes  in  price  with the  different  farm sizes  were  also  rec-
variability on income variability,  making the  ognized  in  the  typical  farm  specifications.
NOSUPP  scenario  difficult  to  compare  with  Table  2  provides  a  summary of selected  de-
the  others.  mographic  and  financial  characteristics  for
the two typical farms used in the simulation
TYPICAL  FARMS  model.  It should be noted  that the  leverage
Twvo  typical  cotton  farm  situations  in the  ratio  is nearly  twice  as  large  for the  1,088-
Texas Southern  High  Plains were  developed  acre farm  as for the  511-acre  farm.  The  rel-
from producer survey data obtained by Smith.  atively  high  debt  load  on  the  larger  farm
The two farms selected for the present study  would  be  expected  to  increase  the  farm's
represent  a  part-time  family  farm  in the  re-  vulnerability to bankruptcy.
gion (511  acres)  and a full-time commercial  Assumptions about the farms in Table 2 are
farm in the region (1,088  acres).  The survey  held constant across all policy and price var-
data  describe  the  typical  characteristics  of  iability  options simulated.  Further  informa-
511  and  1,088  acre  farms  in the  region  in-  tion about the farms used in this analysis can
cluding  volume  of  cotton  produced,  pro-  be found  in Smith.
duction  practices,  machinery  complements,
financial  position,  input  purchases,  market-  SIMULATION  MODEL
ing  experience,  and family  living expenses.
The  typical  farms  include  recognition  of  FLIPSIM  V is a firm level, recursive,  Monte
economies  experienced  by  different  size  Carlo simulation model which simulates  an-
farms.  The  typical farm specifications  reflect  nual production, farm policy, marketing, farm
the differences in input costs associated with  management,  and  income  tax  aspects  of  a
size, the cost advantages associated with typ-  farm.  The  different  size  farms  in  this  study
ical  levels  of  vertical  integration,  and  the  were  simulated  over a  10-year  planning  ho-
marketing  price  advantages  associated  with  rizon which was replicated 503 times for each
each size category.  Smith found that the larger  farm-size/farm-program/price-variability  com-
farms generally realized higher prices due to  bination.
their  ability  to  market  cotton  in  large  lots  In  the FLIPSIM  V  model,  the analyst  may
and that large-scale producers had more eco-  select one  of three  options for  determining
nomic incentive  to invest time in marketing  the crop-mix.  In this study, the farm's crop-
TABLE  2.  DEMOGRAPHIC  AND  FINANCIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  TWO  TYPICAL  FARMS  BY  SIZE  IN  THE  TEXAS  SOUTHERN  HIGH
PLAINS,  1983
Farm  size
Characteristic  Units 
511 acres  1,088  acres
Age of operator  ........................................  ...  years  51.  41
Acres  owned  ........................................  ...  acres  261  381
Acres  leased  ........................................  ...  acres  250  707
Value of owned land  ..................................................  $1,000  163.6  229.8
Value  of equipment  ...................................  .....  $1,000  77.8  169.4
Long-term  debt  ..........................................................  $1,000  36.9  63.1
Intermediate-term  debt  ...............................................  $1,000  37.6  116.8
Net worth  ...........................................  $1,000  166.9  219.3
Long-term  debt to assets  .............................................  pct.  23  27
Intermediate-term  debt to assets  .................................  pct.  48  69
Debt-to-equity ratio  ...................................................  pct.  44  82
Off farm  incomea  ........................................  ...  $1,000  21.0  16.0
Minimum  family  living withdrawal  ............................  $1,000  15.2  15.2
aOff-farm  income  includes only income  from  services or salaries.  Source:  Smith.
3Trials  performed  by Perry  et al.  indicate  that little  additional  information  is gained  by iterating  the  model a
greater number  of times.
100mix of irrigated and dryland cotton was  pre-  for  all  simulation  trials  are  affected  in  the
determined  based  on  the  proportion  of the  same  manner  so  comparisons  of the  alter-
farm that had historically been irrigated. The  native  policy participation  options  are  not
constant  crop-mix  option  was  selected  be-  invalidated by this assumption.
cause it is the simplest. The analysis was also  Equipment purchased prior to 1981  is de-
run  using  the  linear  programming  option;  preciated  using  a  5  to  7  year  life  and  the
however,  little  change was  noted.  double  declining  balance  method.  Equip-
The  analysis was  done using nominal  dol-  ment purchased  after  1980 is cost recovered
lars  to reflect  actual  costs of capital and the  assuming  a  5-year  life  and  accelerated  cost
anticipated investment potentials for farmers.  recovery  rules.  Equipment  which passes  its
Base  production  and  harvesting  costs  ob-  economic  life  (7 to  10 years)  is replaced by
tained  from  the  producer  surveys  were  in-  trading  it for  a new  replacement.  The  cost
creased  at  5  percent  annually  over  the  of replacement  equipment is assumed to in-
planning  horizon  to  account  for  inflation.4 crease  5 percent per year (the inflation rate)
The  model  simulates  cash  production  costs  from its base price.  First year expensing and
by multiplying the inflation adjusted per acre  maximum  investment  tax  credit  are  calcu-
input  costs  by  planted  acreages  for  the  re-  ated for new equipment
spective  crops.  Labor  costs are  calculated  as  Cash receipts for each crop are the product
Cash receipts for each crop are the product the sum  of full-time  labor charges  plus  the,  a  of random yield, harvested acres, fraction of cost of part-time  labor.  Harvesting costs  are crop  marketed,  and  random  price,  less  the the product of the inflation-adjusted  per unit  landlords share o  e
landlord's share of each crop. When the mar- harvesting cost, yield,5 and harvested acreage. 
Average  annual  crop  prices  were  inflated  ket price  is less than  the effective  loan  rate
4 percent  per  year.  Infation  of  prices  re-  for a crop, the operator's  share of the cotton 4  percent  per  year.  Inflation  of prices  re-
ceived  at  a  slightly  lower  rate  than  costs  crop  is  placed  in the  CCC  loan rather  than
ceived  at  alihtyowrattbeing  sold if the operator is assumed to par- reflects  a  trend that  has been  observed  over  bi  if the operator is assumed to par-
the  period  that  the  joint  pdf of prices  and  ticipate  in the program.  Stocks are redeemed
yields was developed. This assumption is con-  from the CCC loan if the market price in the
sistent with Tweeten's  estimate  that farmers  following  year  exceeds  the  net  loan  rate
are able  to pass on only about 72 percent of  Deficiency  payments  are  paid when  the  av-
increased production  costs. This assumption  erage price is  less than the target price. The
may  not  be  valid  for  the  future;  however,  deficiency payment  is a function  of the pay-
results for the simulation trials are all affected  ment rate, farm program yield, harvested  (or
in  the  same  manner  so  comparisons  of the  base)  acreage,  and national  allocation factor
alternative  policy  participation  options  re-  (0.90).
main valid.  The  1982  insurance  rates  for  the  Federal
The model amortizes  all outstanding loans  Crop Insurance program in the study area are
as simple interest mortgages. (Annual interest  used  for both representative  farms.  It is  as-
rates  for  existing  land,  machinery,  and  op-  sumed  that  the farm  operators  elect  the  65
erating loans were, respectively,  8.5,  13,  and  percent  yield  coverage  level  and  the  high
15  percent.)  The  market  value  of farm  ma-  price  guarantee.  This  level  of  coverage  is
chinery  and  cropland  is  updated,  assuming  representative  of the study area  and is  con-
the value of land increases 5 percent per year  sistent  with  other  research  for  the  region
and  the  nominal  value  of used  equipment  (Lemieux  et  al.).  Provisions  to  increase  or
decreases  1  percent  per  year.  The  upward  decrease the annual insurance premium based
adjustment  of land values to keep pace  with  on  loss  records  are  incorporated  into  the
inflation may not reflect the current situation  model.
in the study area,  but is  consistent with  the  After simulating the farm policies selected
longrun trend  over  the data  period.  As with  by the user,  the model  determines  the  farm
the  assumptions  regarding  inflation,  results  operator's year-endfinancial  position and cal-
40ver  the  1980-1983  period,  the  Consumer  Price  Index  rose  from  246.8  to  298.4  (1967=100)  which  is
consistent with  an average  annual  inflation  rate of approximately  5 percent  (U.S.  Department of Commerce).
sAverage  annual  yields were held constant  over the  planning horizon because there  was no discernible  trend in
yields in the  study  region over the time  horizon of the  data.
101culates family cash withdrawals6 and accrued  Selection  of a different  discount rate  would
income taxes. Year-end cash flow deficits  are  not have changed the ranking of results, only
handled as follows:  (a)  grant a  lien on crops  the magnitude of PVENW.  The probability of
in  storage,  (b)  refinance  long-term  equity,  survival  is the number of iterations  the farm
(c)  refinance  intermediate-term  equity,  (d)  remains  solvent divided by the total number
and/or sell  cropland.7 If the  operator  is un-  of iterations  (50).
able to cover the deficit, the farm is declared
insolvent  and the model  begins the  next it-  RESULTS
eration. A farm may also be declared insolvent
if its  debt-to-equity  ratio  exceeds  the  maxi-  The simulation results for the 511-acre and
mum established  by lenders in the local  area  1,088-acre  farms  are  presented  in  tables  3
(2.33).  and 4,  respectively.  For both farms under all
Personal  income  taxes  and social  security  price  variability/policy  participation  com-
taxes  are  calculated  for the operator  who  is  binations,  both the average  present value of
assumed  to be married  and filing a  joint in-  ending  net  worth  PVENW  and  the  average
come  tax return with four personal exemp-  ending acres  operated are  greater  than their
tions.  The  regular  income  tax  liability  is  beginning values, but the amount of increase
computed  using  two  methods:  income  av-  is different  in each  case.
eraging  (if  qualified)  and  the  standard  tax  The  511-acre  farm  exhibits  the  strongest
tables.  The  model  selects  the  tax  strategy  tendency to grow  in terms  of both financial
which  results  in  the  lower  income  tax  lia-  assets and acreage  operated under  a  combi-
bility.  nation of high price variability  and full par-
The  farm  is  permitted  to  grow each  year  ticipation in the farm program (BASIC option).
by  purchasing  cropland  if the  operator  has  For  the  511-acre  farm  under the  BASIC  op-
sufficient cash to cover the 30 percent down  tion,  average  ending  acreage  operated  in-
payment plus additional machinery necessary  creases from 655 acres under the lowest level
for the  proposed  larger  farm.  The  operator  of price  variability  to  805  acres  under  the
is permitted to borrow against equity in land  highest  level  of price  variability.  Similarly,
to meet up to  50 percent  of the  down  pay-  the average present value of ending net worth
ment.  The  farm operation  can  also  grow by  is  $283,700  under  the  BASIC  option  with
leasing  land  if  the  operator  can  meet  the  low  price  variability  and  $345,800  when
downpayment  requirements  for  purchasing  price variability  is high.  This indicates  that,
additional  machinery  needed  by  the  pro-  as hypothesized, farm program provisions in-
posed  large  size  farm.  If machinery  is pur-  teract with high price variability to create  a
chased due  to growth,  it  is depreciated  and  climate  favorable  to farm growth.
the operator's income taxes are recalculated.  For  the  511-acre  farm  under  the  BASIC
Probability  of  survival,  average  present  option,  the  probability of survival  does  not
value of ending  net worth,  and average  end-  appear  to  be  affected  by the  level  of price
ing farm  size  are  the three  criteria for eval-  variability but remains a constant 98 percent,
uating  the  firm  level  impacts  of alternative  indicating  that when full participation in the
farm  programs  and  price  variability  levels.  farm program is elected, increased price var-
The average present value of ending net worth  iability  does not result  in an  increased  risk
(PVENW)  is the farm operator's average end-  of  insolvency  for  farms  with  these  charac-
ing net worth discounted to the first year of  teristics.
the  planning  horizon  using  a  discount  rate  Under  the NOTAR  option,  the  operator  is
of  5  percent.  The  5 percent  figure  was  se-  assumed  to participate  in the  loan and  crop
lected because 5 percent interest is generally  insurance  program,  but  receives  no  defi-
available  on passbook  accounts  in the  area.  ciency payment.  Loss of the  deficiency  pay-
6Limits  on  annual  cash  withdrawals  were  established  at  $15,000  (lower  limit)  and  $40,000  (upper  limit).
Within these limits,  family living expenses were based  on the following  consumption  function:
Withdrawals  =  15,200  +  0.25  (disposable  income  - 15,200); where  disposable  income  is  total  cash  farm
income  minus  accrued  federal  and  self  employment  taxes  and  the  value  of  straight  line  depreciation  for  all
machinery  on  the  farm  which  was  scheduled  for  replacement  at  the  end  of  its  economic  life.  The  marginal
propensity to consume  is based on work reported by Richardson and Nixon. It is the mode of a variety of estimated
marginal propensities  to  consume  for  U.S.  farm  families.  As with other  assumptions  in  this study,  the  choice  of
marginal propensity  to  consume  is  consistent in  all trials  and therefore  will not affect  the  major conclusions  of
this study.
7Cropland which  is sold  to  meet  cash  flow  deficits  is  assumed  to  be  leased back  on  a crop-share  basis.  This
allows the farm  operator  to continue  to  use fully his/her investment  in machinery.
102TABLE  3.  RESULTS  OF  SIMULATING  A TYPICAL  511-ACRE  TEXAS  SOUTHERN  HIGH  PLAINS  COTTON  FARM  FOR  10-YEARS
ASSUMING  FIVE  ALTERNATIVE  LEVELS  OF  PRICE  VARIABILITY  AND  THREE  FARM  PROGRAM  PROVISIONS.
Item  Price variability  levels
a
I  II  III  IV  V
Probability of survival:  ..............................................  ..............................................
BASIC  .........................................................  98  98  98  98  98
NOTAR  .......................................................  98  100  100  98  96
NOSUPP  ......................................................  98  100  98  94  96
PVENW  :c  ·..........................................  Thou  . .........................................
BASIC  ............... 283.7  288.7  311.4  337.7  345.8
NOTAR  .......................................................  263.9  264.4  278.1  297.9  304.0
NOSUPP  ......................................................  262.9  261.4  252.5  242.8  246.5
Average  acreage  operated  in  last solvent  year:  ............................................  Acres  ............................................
BASIC  .........................................................  655  668  725  789  805
NOTAR  ............................................  597  613  626  649  655
NOSUPP  ........................................  585  585  588  597  610
aPrice  variability  level  I  represents 40  percent  of the  normal price  variability.  Similarly,  level  II is  60  percent
of normal,  level III  is  normal,  level  IV  is  40 percent  greater than  normal,  and level V  is 60 percent  greater.
bThe probability of survival  identified in this study is the probability that the farm will maintain  its equity ratios
at  levels  established by local  financial  institutions,  i.e. a debt-to-equity  ratio  of less than  2.33.
This  is  the average  over 50  iterations of the present  value  of ending  net worth.  Initial net worth  for the  farm
was  $166,900.  The  ending  net worth  for the  farm was  discounted using  a  5  percent after  tax discount  rate.
ments  is  hypothesized  to  reduce  producer  financial  position  does  not benefit  from  in-
income,  resulting  in a  reduced  capacity  for  creased  price  variability.  On  the  511-acre
expansion.  It  is  also  hypothesized  that  the  farm, the highest PVENW occurs at the lowest
producer  under  NOTAR  would  be  exposed  level  of price variability.  This indicates  that
to more downside risk from increases in price  it  is the  combination  of farm  program  sup-
variability thus increasing  the probability of  ports  and  high  price  variability  that  stimu-
insolvency.  lates growth and not just increased variability
Results  for the  5  -acre  farm support  th  alon.  For the  51  -acree  farm under NOTAR,
first  hypothesis,  but  not  the  second.  Under  average  ending acreage  rises only slightly as
NOTAR,  the PVENW  and ending  acres  oper-  variability increases.  This very slight level of
ated are less than under BASIC at every level  increase was due to occasional  "good"  years
of price variability.  However,  the same trend  providing  the  necessary  cash  flow  for  land
across  price  variability  is  present  with  av-  expansion.  However,  the decrease  in ending
erage  PVENW  and acres  operated increasing  net  worth  as  variability  increases  demon-
steadily  from  $263,900  and  597  acres,  re-  strates  that  the  stimulus  for  overall  growth
spectively,  at the  lowest  level  of price var-  is missing without the price and income sup-
iability  to  $304,000  and  655  acres  at  the  port programs.
highest  level  of price variability.  Under  the  Under the NOSUPP option,  the probability
NOTAR  option,  growth  appears  to  be  stim-  of survival  for  the  511-acre  farm  does  not
ulated  by high  price  variability,  but  not to  appear  to  be  affected  by the  level  of price
as great an extent as under the BASIC option.  variability.  This result  is  most likely caused
Under the  NOTAR  option,  the probability  by the  initial  financial  strength  of the farm
of  survival  varies  from  96  percent  (price  and the high level of off-farm income. Again,
variability  level  V)  to  100  percent  (price  minor variations in the probability of survival
variability levels II and III). There is no trend  are caused by random elements in the model.
across price variability  levels and  the slight  The 1,088-acre farm begins at a much more
changes  are  explained  by the  random  com-  vulnerable  financial  position.  The  initial  le-
ponents  of the  model.  Because  the  proba-  verage  ratio  is  .82  as  compared  to  .44  for
bility  of  survival  remains  high,  this  farm  the  511-acre  farm.  The  farm  family  is  also
appears  well  protected  from  insolvency  no  assumed  to  have  a  lower  level  of  off-farm
matter what the level  of variability in price.  income,  $16,000  as  compared  to  $21,000.
The characteristics  of this farm,  given  in Ta-  These  characteristics,  representative  of com-
ble  2,  explain  these  results.  The  511-acre  mercial-size  farms  in the  area,  are  hypothe-
farm  has high  off-farm  income  and  a  strong  sized to make this farm much more vulnerable
initial financial position,  making it relatively  to the down-side risks of increased variability.
invulnerable  to insolvency.  It  is  expected  a priori  that  the  probability
The  final  policy  alternative,  NOSUPP,  in-  of survival for this farm will decrease as price
volves  participation  in  only the  crop  insur-  variability  increases  in  the  NOSUPP  option
ance program.  Under NOSUPP,  unlike BASIC  and possibly in the NOTAR and BASIC options
or NOTAR, the farm operator's average ending  as well.
103TABLE  4.  RESULTS  OF  SIMULATING  A TYPICAL  1,088-ACRE  TEXAS  SOUTHERN  HIGH  PLAINS  COTTON  FARM  FOR  10-YEARS
ASSUMING  FIVE  ALTERNATIVE  LEVELS  OF  PRICE  VARIABILITY  AND  THREE  FARM  PROGRAM  PROVISIONS
_____Item  _  Price variability  levels
a
I  II  III  IV  V
Probability of survival:  .. 9...........................................
BASIC  .........................................................  94  92  96  98  96 BASIC  94  92  ............. 98'...............96
NOTAR  .....  ..........................  .....  88  82  78  76  78
NOSUPP  ......................................................  88  80  74  64  58
PVENW  :c  .........................................  Thou.  $  ..........
BASIC  .........................................................  383.2  405.0  451.0  508.2  522.3
NOTAR  ............................  ...........  309.1  311.3  334.6  359.8  387.5
NOSUPP  ......................................................  304.7  295.4  275.2  248.1  245.7
Average  acreage  operated  in last solvent  year:  . . ......................  .................  Acres  ....................................
BASIC  ...........  ..............................  ..  1,229  1,270  1,331  1,350  1,373
NOTAR  .......................................................  1,181  1,206  1,226  1,264  1,293
NOSUPP  .....................................  ........  ...  1,174  1,184  1,203  1,210  1,232
'Price  variability  level  I  represents  40  percent  of the  normal price  variability.  Similarly,  level II  is 60 percent
of normal,  level  III is  normal,  level  IV is 40 percent  greater than normal,  and level V  is  60 percent  greater.
"The probability of survival  identified  in this study is the  probability that the farm will  maintain its equity ratios
at levels  established by local  financial  institutions,  i.e. a debt-to-equity  ratio  of less  than 2.33.
cThis  is the  average  over  50  iterations  of the  present value  of ending  net worth.  Initial net worth for the farm
was  $166,900.  The  ending  net worth  for the  farm was  discounted  using a  5 percent  after tax discount  rate.
Results  for the  1,088-acre  farm are similar  of survival  are mixed.  A reduction in price
to  those  for  the  r  51  -acre  farm  in terms  of  variability below  the historic base (level  III)
PVENW and ending acreage operated, but, as  appears to result in an increased probability
hypothesized,  there  is  a  difference  in terms  of survival, but an increase in price variability
of probability of survival  under the  NOTAR  beyond the base  does  not appear to  have  an
and  NOSUPP  options,  Table  4.  Under  the  adverse effect because  the CCC loan program
BASIC option for the 1,088-acre farm, PVENW  protects producers  from low  prices.
increases with price variabilityfrom $383,200  In  the  final  policy  option,  NOSUPP,  the
at  the  lowest  level  of  price  variability  to  probability of survival for the 1,088-acre farm
$522,300  at the  highest  level  of price vari-  is affected by an increase  in variability, drop-
ability.  Similarly,  average ending  acreage in-  ping from  88 percent  at the  lowest  level  of
creases  from  1,229 acres at price variability  price variability to 58 percent at the highest.
level  I to 1,373  acres at price variability level  This indicates that, without price and income
V. On this  farm,  as well  as  on  the  511-acre  supports from the farm program,  a farm that
farm,  a combination of high price variability  has a moderate to high debt exposure  is more
and participation  in the farm  program stim-  vulnerable  to  insolvency  under highly vari-
ulates  growth.  able  prices.
Under the BASIC  option,  the probability of  Under  NOSUPP,  the  1,088-acre  farm  be-
survival  does  not  appear  to  be  affected  by  haves similarly to the 511-acre farm in terms
the  level  of price  variability.  There  is  vari-  of  PVENW  and ending  acres  operated.  High
ation  in the  results, but the variation is  not  price  variability  alone  does  not  appear  to
a consistent trend and is explained by random  stimulate growth. The PVENW declines  stead-
processes in the model.  For both cotton farms  ily with  price variability  from  $304,700  at
tested  in  this  study,  it appears  that a  com-  the  lowest  level  of  price  variability  to
bination of full participation in the farm pro-  $245,700  at the highest  level.  Average  end-
gram  and  high  price  variability  (level  V)  ing  acreage  increases  slightly  as  price vari-
stimulates  financial  and  physical  expansion  ability  increases,  but  the  overall  financial
of the farm  firm without resulting in an  in-  strength of the  farm declines.
creased likelihood  of firm failure.  Previous work  in the  study area by  Smith
For the  1,088-ace  farm under the NOTAR  et  al.  indicate  that, under  historical  price
option,  PVENW  and average  ending  acreage  variability, participation in the farm program
increase with price variability from $309,100  stimulates physical and financial growth. This
and  1,181  acres,  respectively,  at the  lowest  study extends  these  results.  Participation in
level  of price  variability  to  $387,500  and  the  farm  program results  in  higher  PVENW
1,293  acres  at  the  highest  level  of  price  and average ending acres operated regardless
variability. Under this option, expansion  con-  of the level  of price variability. For example,
tinues to  be  stimulated  by high price varia-  at the historical level  of price variability (level
bility but not to  as great  an extent as under  III)  average  ending  acreage  for  the  1,088-
the BASIC  option.  Results for the probability  acre  farm  is  1,331  acres  under  BASIC  com-
104pared  to  1,203  acres  under  NOSUPP,  Table  der  the  BASIC  and  NOTAR  scenarios,  both
4.  Similarly,  at  price  variability  level  I,  av-  farms  experience  increased  financial  and
erage ending acreage operated for the 1,088-  physical  growth  when  price  variability  in-
acre  farm  is  1,229  under  BASIC  and  only  creases.  For  the  511-acre  farm,  the  proba-
1,174 under NOSUPP. This indicates that farm  bility  of  survival  is  not  affected  by  price
program  participation  plays  a  major  role  in  variability  when the  operator  does not par-
farm growth regardless of the level of market  ticipate in the target price program  (NOTAR).
price variability.  On the other hand, the probability of survival
Smith  et  al.  hypothesized  that  increased  for  the  1,088-acre  farm  under  NOTAR  in-
price variability would result in a wider spread  creases somewhat when price variability drops
for ending farm size under the different  pol-  below the historical  level.
icy participation  scenarios.  Results from this  Without  an income  and price support pro-
study support this hypothesis. For both farms,  gram,  financial  and  physical  growth  is  re-
the  greatest  difference  in  ending  farm  size  duced  for  both  farms  at all  levels  of price
between  the NOSUPP and BASIC trials occurs  variability.  As  price  variability  increases,
at price variability level V. Thus, results from  present value of ending net worth decreases
this study indicate that farm-level policy sim-  steadily  for  both  farms.  The  probability  of
ulations are sensitive to the assumed level of  survival  for the  511  -acre farm  remains  high
price variability,  for all  levels of price variability  despite the
absence  of price and income supports.  How-
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS  ever, the probability of survival for the 1,088-
acre  farm  decreases  steadily  as  price  varia- The  objective  of this  study was  to  assess  bility  increases.  The  511-acre  farm  remains
the effects  of alternative  levels  of price  var-  relatively invulnerable  to insolvency  due  to
iability  on  farm  growth  and  survival  for  a  a  strong  initial  financial  position  and  rela-
select set  of farm program  options.  Two dif-  tively  high  off-farm  income,  characteristics
ferent  cotton  farms  in  the  Texas  Southern  of farms  of this  size  in  the  study  area.  By
High Plains were simulated stochastically over  contrast, the 1,088-acre farm is characterized
a  10-year  period,  under 5 alternative  levels  as having  a higher debt exposure  and lower
of price variability and 3 farm policy options.  off-farm  income.
The farms represented a family-size part-time  Results  from this  study  have implications
operation  in the  study  area  (511  acres  be-  for the current policy environment. Programs
ginning size) and a full-time commercial-size  that protect  producers  from downside  price
farm in the study area (1,088 acres beginning  and income risks appear to stimulate growth,
size).  Alternative  levels  of price  variability  particularly  when  markets  are  volatile.  For
were  developed  by  scaling  the  historical  the  two  farms  in  this  study,  both  physical
standard  deviations  for  the  price  variables  and financial growth appear most stimulated
over  a  range  of plus  or  minus  60  percent  by a combination  of full participation in the
and using these scaled  standard deviations to  farm  program  and high levels  of price  vari-
develop  alternative  multivariate  pdfs.  Farm  ability.  Although the  study area was  limited
policy options included  participation  in the  to the Texas Southern High Plains,  it is prob-
loan program,  the target price program,  and  able that the trends observed  on these farms
all-risk crop insurance  (BASIC); participation  would occur  generally  in the  United States.
in the loan and crop insurance only (NOTAR);  Results  from this  study also  have  broader
and participation in only the crop insurance  implications  for  policy  analysts.  It  appears
program  (NOSUPP).  that farm-level  policy simulation  studies are
Results of the study indicate that increasing  sensitive  to the  assumed  level  of price  var-
price variability  leads to higher average  end-  iability. It would be advisable,  therefore,  for
ing  net worth  and  more  rapid  farm  growth  analysts to test alternative  price distributions
in the presence of farm programs that protect  when  analyzing  the possible  effects  of farm
producers from low prices and incomes.  Un-  program  provisions.
REFERENCES
Bailey,  D.  C.  "Economic  Analysis of Selected Marketing  Strategies  for  Cotton in the  Texas
Southern High Plains:  A Whole-Farm  Simulation Approach."  Unpublished  Ph.D. thesis,
Texas  A&M  University,  Department  of Agricultural  Economics,  1983.
Chen, D.  T. "The Wharton Agricultural  Model:  Structure, Specification and Some Simulation
Results."  Amer. J. Agr.  Econ.,  59,1(1977):  107-16.
105Gardner,  B.  L. "Consequences  of USDA's  Farmer-Owned  Reserve  Program  for Grain  Stocks
and  Prices."  GAO  Report  to Congress,  CED-81-80,  Vol.  2,  1981.
Lemieux, C.  M., J. W. Richardson,  and C. J. Nixon.  "Federal Crop Insurance vs. ASCS Disaster
Assistance  for  Texas  High  Plains  Cotton  Producers:  An  Application  of  Whole-Farm
Simulation."  West. J.  Agr. Econ.,  7(1982):  142-53.
Lin,  W.,  J.  Glauber,  L. Hoffman,  K.  Collins,  and  S.  Evans.  "The  Farmer-Owned  Reserve
Release  Mechanism  and State  Grain  Prices."  ERS  Staff Report No. AGES850717.  USDA-
ERS,  1985.
Meyers, W. H. and M. E. Ryan. "The Farmer-Owned Reserve:  How is the Experiment Working?"
Amer. J.  Agr.  Econ., 63,2(1981):  316-23.
Penson, J. B.,  D. W. Hughes, and R.  F. Romain.  "An Overview of COMGEM: A Macroeconomic
Model  Emphasizing  Agriculture."  DIR  84-1,  SP-12.  Texas  Agricultural  Experiment
Station,  December,  1984.
Perry,  G., M.  W. Rister, J.  W. Richardson, W.  R. Grant, and J. W.  Sij.  "The  Impact of Tenure
Arrangements  and Crop Rotations  on Upper Gulf Coast Rice Farms."  Texas Agricultural
Experiment  Station,  Bulletin B-1530,  1986.
Ray, D. E. andJ. W. Richardson. Detailed  Description  ofPolysim. Oklahoma State Agricultural
Experiment  Station  and  USDA,  Technical  Bulletin T-151,  1978.
Richardson,  J. W.  and C. J.  Nixon.  "Description  of FLIPSIM  V: A  General  Firm Level  Policy
Simulation  Model."  Texas Agricultural  Experiment  Station,  Bulletin  B-1528,  1986.
Salathe,  L.  J.,  M. Price, and D. E. Banker.  "An Analysis of the Farmer-Owned Reserve Program,
1977-82."  Amer. J.  Agr. Econ.,  66,1(1984):  1-11.
Skees, J. R.  "A Multiple  Farm Simulation  Model of the Impact of Income Tax and Commodity
Policies  on  the  Opportunities  for  Growth  of Varied  Size  Corn/Soybean  Farms."  Un-
published  Ph.D.  thesis,  Michigan  State  University,  1981.
Smith, E.  G.  "Economic  Impact of Current and Alternative Farm Programs  on Farm Structure
in the Southern High Plains of Texas." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Texas A&M University;
December,  1982.
Smith,  E.  G., J.  W.  Richardson,  and  R.  Knutson.  "Impact  of Alternative  Farm  Programs  on
Different Size Cotton Farms in the Texas Southern High Plains: A Simulation Approach."
West. J.  Agr. Econ.,  10(1985):  365-74.
Tweeten,  L. G.  "An Economic  Investigation  Into Inflation  Passthrough to the Farm Sector."
West. J.  Agr.  Econ., 5(1980):  89-106.
U.S.  Department  of Agriculture.  Cotton Price Statistics. Agricultural  Marketing  Service,
Cotton  Division,  Various  Issues.
U.S.  Department  of Commerce.  Statistical Abstract of the  United States,  1985.  (105th
edition)  Washington,  D.C.;  1984.
106